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36 DEXTER v. DEXTER [42 C.2d 
[L.A. No. 22499. In Bank. Jan. 8, 1954.] 
lVIARY DEXTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RAYl\10ND 
C. DEXTER, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se.-A husband and 
wife may contract with respect to their property ( Civ. Code, 
§ 158), and if they are living separate and apart they may 
provide for support and maintenance of either of them and 
their children. ( Civ. Code, § 159.) 
[2] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-
Effect of Agreement of Parties.-As between husband and 
wife, if provisions in an agreement by them for support and 
maintenance have been made an integral or inseverable part 
of division of their property, and court in a divorce action has 
approved agreement, its provisions cannot thereafter be 
modified without consent of both parties. 
[3] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement. of Parties.-Where husband and wife enter into 
agreement prior to divorce wherein they expressly state that 
they intend finally to settle both division of their property 
and their rights and duties with respect to support and main-
tenance, and each party waives "any and all right to support, 
care and maintenance" other "than as expressly provided for 
herein," the provision for monthly payments does not consti-
tute a separable agreement for payment of alimony Sl'~bject 
to continuing jurisdiction of court to modify. 
[ 4] Id.- Permanent Alimony- Effect of Agreement of Parties: 
Modification of Allowance.-Where husband and wife have 
made a provision for support and maintenance an integral 
part of their property settlement agreement, the monthly pay-
ments will ordinarily have a dual character; to the extent 
that they are designed to discharg·e obligation of support and 
maintenance they will ordinarily have indicia of alimony, but 
to the extent that they represent a division of community 
property itself, or constitute an inseparable part of considera-
tion for property settlement, they are not alimony and ac-
cordingly cannot be modified without changing terms of prop-
erty settlement agreement. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 44 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Husband and Wife, § 252 et seq. 
[2] See Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 643 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife,§ 154; [2, 3, 5-8] 
Divorce, § 216(1); [4] Divorce, §§ 203, 216; [9] Husband and 
Wife,§ 157(4); [10] Divorce,§§ 216, 234(2); [11] Divorce,§ 203; 
[12] Divorce, § 179(3). 
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!d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-\Vhere provision in property settle-
ment agreement for monthly payments was expressly incor-
porated in interlocutory divoree decree and husband ordered 
to perform it, but there had been no previous adjudication 
that the monthly payments were alimony and interlocutory 
decree itself did not purport to determine charaeter of pay-
ments, such provision did not become merged in decree so as 
to be subject to modification pursuant to Civ. Code, § 139. 
[6] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-In absence of an order for pay-
ment of alimony in interlocutory decree, or a reservation of 
jurisdiction to make such an order in the future, court cannot, 
after interlocutory decree has become final, add a provision 
for alimony or modify amount of payments ordered pursuant to 
a property settlement agreement. 
[7] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-If wife was dissatisfied with her 
contract whereby she had made support and maintenance pro-
visions an integral part of settlement of property rights and 
had tenable grounds for setting it aside, she should have at-
tacked agreement before interlocutory divorce decree was 
entered; she cannot, after having secured approval of agree-
ment by court and having accepted benefits thereof, seek relief 
inconsistent with its terms. 
[8] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect 
of Agreement of Parties.-lf wife agreed to accept less than 
her share of community property in exchange for greater sup-
port and maintenance payments, it would be unjust to her 
subsequently to hold that payments were alimony subject to 
reduction on husband's motion. 
[9] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Property Settle-
ment Agreements-Consideration.-Since at time a property 
settlement agreement is made, the parties may be uncertain 
as to which of their property is community rather than 
separate, and they will ordinarily not know how court in 
divorce action will find the facts or how it would, in absence 
of an acceptable agreement, exercise its discretion in dividing 
property and awarding alimony, the amicable adjustment of 
these doubtful questions with respect to property and sup-
port and maintenance rights of the parties may alone supply 
sufficient consideration to support their entire agreement. 
[10] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance: 
Disposition of Community Property.-Where plaintiff secured 
her divorce on ground of extreme cruelty, had the parties not 
settled their rights by agreement, court could in its discretion 
have awarded plaintiff all of community property and less 
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alimony than she received under her agreement, in which case 
the alimony wonld hP snhjrct to reduction in event of changed 
circumstances. 
[11] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.-
Wife is entitled to agree to an equal division of community 
property in exchange for support and maintenance payments 
that cannot be reduced; accordingly, the fact that community 
property is divided equally has no bearing on validity of pro-
vision of agreement whereby both parties waive all rights to 
support and maintenance other than as provided therein. 
[12] !d.-Counsel Fees and Costs-Pending AppeaL-On hearing 
of divorced wife's petition for increase in amount of monthly 
payments provided for in property settlement agreement and 
awarded her by decree, trial court has jurisdiction to determine 
character of payments involved; accordingly, divorce action is 
still pending within meaning of Civ, Code, § 137.3, so as to 
authorize court to order husband to pay wife's costs and at-
torney fees on appeal. 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of I_jos An-
geles County refusing divorced wife's petition to increase 
amount of monthly payments awarded her by judgment, and 
allowing attorney fees and costs on appeal. Louis H. Burke 
and Lewis Drucker,"' Judges. Affirmed. 
Hightower & Martin, Irving M. ·walker, John L. Martin, 
and Mark Mullin for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Macfarlane, Schaefer & Haun and William Gamble for De-
fendant and Appellant. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On May 25, 1944, plaintiff Mary Dexter 
and her husband, defendant Raymond Dexter, executed an 
agreement providing for the division of their community 
property and the support and maintenance of plaintiff and 
the children of the marriage. The agreement recited that 
the parties were separated and had lived apart for some time, 
that the separation appeared to be permanent, and that "The 
said parties desire to effect a division of their community 
property and to provide for the support and maintenance of 
[plaintiff] and said children by friendly agreement, instead 
of resorting to court for said purpose." It then provided 
that certain enumerated property should be conveyed to and 
become the separate property of plaintiff. The next para-
*Judge pro tern., assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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graphs provided that "[Defendant] agrees to pay to [plain-
tiff] for her support and maintenance and the support of their 
adult daughter and minor son, the sum of one hundred fifty 
dollars ($150.00) per month .... In addition thereto first 
party agrees to pay for the daughter's Sorority dues and other 
expenses the sum of twenty-five ($25.00) per month, com-
mencing June 1, 1944, and continuing thereafter so long as 
said daughter remains an undergraduate in college, and un-
married, but not to exceed (2) years from June 1, 1944. 
''When the minor son of the parties hereto leaves school 
and goes to work, or when and if he goes into the military 
forces of the United States, then the monthly payment of 
[plaintiff] shall be decreased to one hundred dollars .... 
"In addition to the above amounts, [defendant] agrees, at 
his expense, to fix up the guest or maid's house at the premises 
ab'ove described, and to repair the fence on said property. 
"Upon the marriage of [plaintiff], all payments to her for 
her support and maintenance shall cease, but the payments 
for the minor son and daughter shall continue on the terms 
hereinabove provided. Upon the death of [plaintiff], all 
payments hereunder shall cease and [defendant] will assume 
any obligation for the support of said children. 
" ( 4) All money and property of the parties hereto, other 
than that agreed to be conveyed to [plaintiff], shall be con-
veyed to [defendant], and shall become the separate property 
of [defendant] .... 
'' ( 6) Other than as expressly provided for herein, the 
respective parties hereto do hereby release the other party 
hereto respectively from any and all right of support, care 
and maintenance, as the husband or wife, respectively, of the 
other party. It is the intention of the parties hereto to make 
a final settlement herein of all rights of support, care and 
maintenance, one against the other, and to release the other 
party respectively from all rights of such support, care and 
maintenance other than as herein provided. . . . 
" ( 8) Neither party hereto waives any cause of action for 
divorce which he or she, respectively, has against the other 
party hereto. 
"In any action for divorce or maintenance hereafter brought 
by either party, [plaintiff] waives any right to alimony, tem-
porary or permanent, other than such amount as is provided 
for hereinabove for her support. 
" [Defendant] assumes and agrees to pay all attorneys fees 
incurred by the parties hereto in the execution of this agree-
40 DEXTER v. DEXTER [42 C.2d 
ment and agrees to pay all court costs and reasonable counsel 
fees iEcu:rred by [plaintiff] in any action for divorce which 
she may file against [defendant.] '' 
Shortly after this agreement was executed plaintiff filed an 
action for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. She 
attached the agreement to the complaint and prayed that it 
be approved, that defendant be directed to comply with it, 
and that alimony be awarded in accordance with its terms. 
Defendant defaulted and an interlocutory decree -vvas entered. 
The decree approved the agreement, ordered defendant 
to comply with it, and provided that pursuant to its terms, 
''defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff monthly the 
sum of $150.00 ... commencing June 1, 1944; provided, 
however, that ·when the son Norman Greenaway Dexter, 
leaves school and goes to work, or when he goes into the 
military forces of the United States, the said monthly 
award shall be reduced to the sum of $100.00 per month.'' 
The decree also expressly incorporated the provision with 
respect to the payment of $25 per month for the college ex-
penses of the adult daughter of the parties. A final decree 
was entered approximately one year later. In 1952 plaintiff 
petitioned the court to increase the amount of the monthly 
payments to $800 on the ground of changed circumstances. 
The court entered its order refDsing modification on the 
ground that it had no jurisdiction to modify the amount of 
the payments. Plaintiff appealed and secured an order for 
attorney fees and eosts on appeal, and defendant appealed 
from the latter order. 
Plaintiff contends that the payments ordered to be made 
pursuant to the agreement are alimony subject to modification 
by the eourt under section 139 of the Civil Code. Defendant, 
on the other hand, contends that they constitute an integral 
part of the property settlement agreement of the parties and 
are not, therefore, subject to modification. 
[1] A. husband and wife may contract with respect to 
their property ( Civ. Code, § 158), and if they are living· Rep-
arate and apart they may provide for the support and main-
tenance of either of them and their children. ( Civ. Code, 
§ 159.) [2] Moreover, as between the husband and wife, 
if the provisions for support and maintenance have been made 
an integral or inseverable part of the division of their prop-
erty, and the court in a eli vorce action has approved the agree-
ment, its provisions eannot thereafter be modified without 
the consent of both of the parties. (Tuttle v. Tuttle, 38 Cal. 
Jan. 1954] DEXTER v. DEX'fER 
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2d 419, 420-422 [240 P.2d 587]; Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 
621, 625 [177 P.2d 265); Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 
841-842 [136 P.2d 1]; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 
175-178 [44 P.2d 540); Sasanoff v. Sasanoff, 120 Cal.App.2d 
120, 127 [260 P.2d 840); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 94 Cal. 
App.2d 293, 299 [210 P.2d 750]; Alexander v. Alexander, 88 
Cal.App.2d 724, 726-727 [199 P.2d 348] ; Holloway v. Hollo-
way, 79 Cal.App.2d 44, 46-47 [179 P.2d 22); Kohl v. Kohl, 
66 Cal.App.2d 535, 540-541 [152 P.2d 494]; Landres v. Ros-
asco, 62 Cal.App.2d 99, 105-106 [144 P.2d 20] ; Rich v. Rich, 
44 Cal.App.2d 526, 530 [112 P.2d 780] .) 
[3] It is clear that the parties executed such an agreement 
in this case. They expressly stated that they intended finally 
to settle both the division of their property and their rights 
and duties with respect to support and maintenance, and each 
party waived ''any and all right to support, care and main-
tenance" other "than as expressly provided for herein." It 
would be contrary to the clearly expressed intention of the 
parties to hold that the provision for monthly payments con-
stituted a separable agreement for the payment of alimony 
subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court to modify. 
Plaintiff contends, however, that since the monthly payments 
were to terminate on her death or remarriage and were de-
scribed as alimony in the prayer of her complaint, they should 
be so treated. She points out that if they were intended as 
a division of property it would have been more reasonable for 
the agreement to provide that they should continue until a 
given amount had been paid. These considerations would be 
more persuasive if the issue presented was whether, on the 
one hand, the monthly payments were solely part of a division 
of the community property, or, on the other hand, solely 
alimony. [4] When, as in this case, however, the parties 
have made the provision for support and maintenance an 
integral part of their property settlement agreement, the 
monthly payments will ordinarily have a dual character. To 
the extent that they are designed to discharg·e the obligation 
of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the 
characteristics of that obligation and thus have the indicia 
of alimony. (See P1tckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 838 
[136 P.2d 1]; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 174 [44 
P.2d 540) ; Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 537 [152 P.2d 
494] .) On the other hand, to the extent that they represent 
a division of the community property itself, or constitute an 
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settle-
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ment, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modi-
fied without changing· the terms of the property settlement 
agreement of the parties. 
[5] Plaintiff contends, however, that when the provision 
of the agreement for monthly payments was expressly incor-
porated into the interlocutory decree and defendant was or-
dered to perform it, it became merged in the decree, and that 
therefore, under the rule stated in Ilmtgh v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 
605 [160 P.2d 15], it was subject to modification pursuant 
to section 139 of the Civil Code. In the Hough case, however, 
it had become res judicata that the payments there involved 
were alimony and not an integral part of a property settle-
ment. Accordingly, the court was not called upon to review 
the correctness of that determination, and it held that an agree-
ment for alimony that had been merged in a divorce decree 
could no longer be enforced in an independent action. In the 
present case, on the other hand, there has been no previous 
adjudication in modification proceedings that the monthly pay-
ments are alimony. Moreover, the interlocutory decree itself 
did not purport to determine the character of the payments. 
It merely ordered defendant to make them pursuant to the 
terms of the agreement and thus made clear that judgment 
remedies including contempt would be available for the en-
forcement of his obligations. 
[6] In the absence of an order for the payment of alimony 
in the interlocutory decree, such as the order that had been 
found to be present in the Hough case (see, also, Werner v. 
Werne1·, 120 Cal.App.2d 248, 249-252 [260 P.2d 961] ; 
Dunning v. Dunning, 114 Cal.App.2d 110, 114 [249 P.2d 609]; 
Pearman v. Pearman, 104 Cal.App.2d 250, 253 [231 P.2d 101] ; 
W eeclon v. Weedon, 92 Cal.App.2d 367, 369-370 [207 P.2d 
78] ; Gosnell v. Webb, 60 Cal.App.2d 1, 3-5 [139 P.2d 985]), 
or a reservation of jurisdiction to make such an order in the 
future, the court cannot, after the interlocutory decree has 
become final, add a provision for alimony or modify the 
amount of payments ordered pursuant to a property settle-
ment agreement. [7] Accordingly, if plaintiff was dissat-
isfied with her contract whereby she had made the support 
and maintenance provisions an integral part of the settle-
ment of property rights and had tenable grounds for setting 
it aside, she should have attacked the agreement before the 
interlocutory decree was entered. She cannot, however, after 
having secured its approval by the court and having accepted 
the benefits thereof, now seek relief inconsistent with its terms. 
,Tan. 1954] DEXTER v. DEXTER 
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(Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal.2d 520, 523-524 [196 P.2d 909] ; 
Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621,627-628 [177 P.2d 265].) 
In support of her motion for an increase in the monthly 
payments, plaintiff filed an uncontradicted affidavit stating 
that under their agreement the parties divided the community 
property equally. She contends that a provision waiving all 
support and maintenance except as is provided in a property 
settlement agreement is invalid unless it is given in exchange 
for a greater share of the community property than that to 
·which the party would otherwise be entitled. Although it 
·was that type of agreement that was present in the Adams case, 
the rationale of that decision applies equally to other types 
of integrated bargains. [8] Thus if the wife agreed to 
accept less than her share of the community property in ex-
change for greater support and maintenance payments, it 
·would be unjust to her subsequently to hold that the payments 
were alimony subject to reduction on motion of the husband. 
(See 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, p. 801.) [9] More-
over, at the time a property settlement is made, the parties 
may be uncertain as to which of their property is community 
rather than separate, and they will ordinarily not know how 
the court in the divorce action will find the facts or how it 
would, in the absence of an acceptable agreement, exercise its 
discretion in dividing the property and awarding alimony. 
'l'he amicable adjustment of these doubtful questions with 
respect to the property and support and maintenance rights 
of the parties may alone supply sufficient consideration to 
support their entire agreement. (Bennett v. Bennett, 219 
Cal. 153, 159 [25 P.2c1 426].) Thus in the present case, the 
parties recited that they desired to settle their property and 
support and maintenance rights "by friendly agreement, in-
stead of resorting to court for said purpose.'' [10] More-
over, since plaintiff secured her divorce on the ground of 
<'xtreme cruelty, had the parties not settled their rights by 
agreement, the court could in its discretion have awarded 
plaintiff all of the community property and less alimony than 
Rhe r<~ceiYed under her agreement. In such case, however, the 
alimony would be subject to reduction in the event of changed 
cireumstances. [11] Plaintiff was entitled to agree instead 
to an equal division of the community property in exchange 
foe support and maintenance payments that could not be 
reduced. Accordingly, the fact that the community property 
was divided equally has no bearing on the validity of the 
44 DEXTER v. DEXTER [42 0.2d 
provision of the agreement whereby both parties waived all 
rights to support and maintenance other than as provided 
therein. (T1dtlc v. Ttdtlc, 38 Oal.2c1419, 420 [240 P.2d 587]; 
Sasanoff v. Sasanojj, 120 Oal.App.2d 120, 127 [260 P.2d 
840]; see, ah;o, Hamilton v. Hamilton, 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 
299 [210 P.2d 750]; Holloway v. Holloway, 79 Oal.App.2d 
44, 45-46 [179 P.2d 22] .) 
[12] Defendant contends that if the payments are not 
subjeet to modifieation, the court had no power to order him 
to pay plaintiff's costs and attorney fees on appeal. 'fhe trial 
eourt had jurisdietion, howeyer, to determine in this proeeed-
ing the eharacter of the payments involved, and accordingly, 
the divorce action is still pending within the meaning of sec-
tion 137.3 of the Civil Code. (Lerner v. Snperior Court, 38 
Cal.2d 676, 685 [242 P.2d 321]; Wilson v. Wilson, 33 Cal.2d 
107, 115 [199 P.2d 671] .) Since plaintiff did not waive any 
right ,;he might have to attorney fees and costs in her agree-
ment and no abuse of discretion has been shown, the order 
awarding costs and attorney fees on appeal must be affirmed. 
'fhe orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Sehauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CART:BJR, J., Concnrring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
judgment affirming tho orders in this case but I disagree with 
some of the reasoning leading thereto. 
The trial court here entered its order refusing modification 
of the support provisions incorporated in the interlocutory 
and final decrees of divorce on the ground that it had no 
jurisdiction to modify the amount of the payments. 
Prior to entering its order, the trial court sustained defend-
ant's objection to the introduction of evidence on the ground 
that the rights of the parties were governed by their contract. 
The majority here say that: ''The trial court had jurisdic-
tion, however, to determine in this proceeding the character 
of the payments involved, ... " This is inconsistent with 
its holding that the orclers are to be affirmed. If the trial 
court could determine the character of the payments which 
were provided for in the agreement entered into between the 
parties, then it improperly sustained defendant's objection 
to the introduction of evidence on that issue, and the case 
should have been reversed. Not only is the majority opinion 
in this case inconsistent in itself, but it is i.nc;Q{IJ'li:'ltent with 
Jan. 1954] DEXTER v. DEXTER 
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the case of Fox v. Fox, post, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881], where 
it was said: ''Plaintiff contends, however, that since the pay-
ments were labeled alimony, were to cease on her remarriage, 
and were subject to modification in the event of a reduction 
of defendant's pension, there is evidence to support the trial 
court's implied finding that they were solely alimony subject 
to modification. In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evi-
dence, the interpretahon placed ~tpon the agt·eement by the 
tTial cmrrt is not binding on this court on appeal . ... " (Em-
phasis added.) The clear implication from this is that the 
character of the payments is a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the trial court upon evidence offered by the parties 
for that purpose. It is admitted that "there has been no 
previous adjudication in modification proceedings that the 
monthly payments are alimony. Moreover, the interlocutory 
decree itself did not purport to determine the character of 
the payments. It merely ordered defendant to make them 
pursuant to the terms of the agreement and thus made clear 
that judgment remedies including contempt would be avail-
able for the enforcement of his obligation.'' 
With the holding of the majority that this was a property 
settlement agreement entered into between the parties which 
the court had no power to modify, I agree. It is said that 
plaintiff ''cannot, however, after having secured its approval 
by the court and having accepted the benefits thereof, now 
seek relief inconsistent with its terms.'' The factual situa-
tion here presented shows that the trial court approved the 
agreement entered into between the parties in its entirety and 
ordered that it be performed. It also shows that the support 
provisions for plaintiff were ''pursuant to the terms of said 
agreement'' set forth in the interlocutory decree of divorce 
which was granted to the plaintiff. The rule in such a case 
should be that if the entire agreement is approved by the court 
and part of its provisions are incorporated in the decree and 
ordered to be performed, those portions included in the decree 
may be enforced by contempt proceedings. The balance of 
the provisions, approved by the court but not incorporated 
in the decree, may be enforced by separate action. It should 
also be the rule that where the terms of a property settlement 
or separation agreement or an agreement for support and 
maintenance have been approved by the court as valid and 
enforceable and incorporated in the decree, the court may 
not, in that action, or in a later action, modify its terms and 
46 DEXTER v. DEXTER [42 0.2d 
prov1s10ns. Once presented to the court, approved by it, in-
corporated in the decree and the performance thereof ordered, 
the parties are bound by their agreement with respect to sup-
port and maintenance, or alimony, as the case may be. 
There are several code provisions (§§ 158, 159, 175) which 
all grant to the parties the right to contract with each other. 
In the absence of fraud or overreaching there is no reason 
why a contract providing for support and maintenance should 
not be given the dignity accorded to other contracts. A 
majority of this court accords that dignity to a property settle-
ment agreement which provides for monthly payments but 
holds that the trial court has power to determine the character 
of the payments. In the present case that statement is a 
non seqnittw since the majority sustains the trial court's action 
in refusing to admit evidence concerning the character of the 
payments. Where we disagree is that I believe that once the 
parties have entered into an agreement whether it purports 
to divide the property, or provide for support and maintenance 
payments without a division of the property, which is found 
to be fair and equitable, the subject is forever closed and the 
parties are bound by the terms of their agreement. Incorpora-
tion in the decree has only the effect of making the remedy 
on the judgment and not on the agreement which has become 
merged therein. In the event of lack of incorporation, the 
remedy is on the agreement which should have the same dignity 
as other contracts. 
In these three cases (Dexter v. Dexter, Fox v. Fox, Flynn 
v. Flynn) this court had an opportunity to clarify the law 
so that stability might be given to property settlement agree-
ments and agreements for support and maintenance. Not 
only do the majority holdings in th.ese three cases not settle 
the law, but they add untold confusion. The import of the 
Flynn decision is that an appellate court may order a property 
settlement agreement, which is not even in the record, attached 
to a judgment of divorce after that judgment has become 
final. As I pointed out in my dissent there, there was no 
adequate incorporation and the parties should have resorted 
to an action on the agreement itself for the sum and substance 
of their rights and duties, it having been approved by the 
court in the divorce action. The import of this case is that 
the question of the character of the payments involved in the 
agreement of the parties now merged in the divorce decree is 
a question of fact for the trial court which it may determine 
without any evidence on the subject other than the agreement 
Jan. 1954] DEXTER v. DEXTER 
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itself. This result naturally flows from its affirmance of the 
trial court's action in refusing to admit plaintiff's evidence 
on the subject. 'l'he logical inference, of course, to be drawn 
from the action of the trial court is that it impliedly con-
sidered the agreement to be one of property settlement. Then 
we have the Fox ease wherein it is said that in the absence 
of conflicting extrinsic evidence the finding of the trial court 
on the character of the payments is not binding on an appel-
late court. If no evidence is necessary, or admissible, then 
this court, or any District Court of Appeal, may make its 
ovH1 determination as to the character of the payments agreed 
upon by and between the spouses to the end that litigation 
in these matters will be endless and the law on the subject 
Yvill be without any stability whatsoever. As I pointed out in 
my dissent in the Flynn case, how will attorneys know how 
to advise, or act for, their clients in cases of this kind? The 
obvious answer is that they will not have the remotest idea 
whether to incorporate the entire agreement in haec verba, or 
in substance, or attach it physically to the decree of divorce 
or whether, no matter how it is done, the trial court, or any 
appellate court will not determine that if monthly payments 
are provided for those payments constitute alimony subject 
to modification. 
Left open in the majority opinions in all three cases, but 
there by implication, is whether the parties may contract 
with each other as to alimony, or support and maintenance, 
where no property division as such is involved. If the parties 
agree on a certain sum to be paid monthly, or annually, or 
semiannually, in lieu of any lump sum provision, that agree-
ment, if fair and equitable, should have the same stability 
as where there has been a division of property by agreement. 
So far as alimony per se is concerned, if the parties cannot 
or for some reason do not themselves reach an amicable agree-
ment on the subjeet, the trial court has the power to make 
such provision in the decree. In this event, the amount would, 
of eourse, be subject to modification under the continuing 
jurisdiction of the court. Why the parties should not be 
able to make a binding agreement for the payment of alimony 
or money purely for support and maintenance, is not made 
clear by the majority. 
The majority opinion in each of these cases leaves the 
obvious implication that if such an agreement is incorpo-
rated in the decree, its provisions will be subject to modifi-
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cation, but if it is not so incorporated, it may not be modified. 
This implication follows from the majority holding that if 
the agreement is incorporated, the court has power to deter-
mine the character of the payments, that is, whether they are 
for alimony or a part of a property settlement. Why the 
difference? Is not a fair, just and valid agreement to pay 
alimony or support money just as binding as one which also 
contains provisions for a property settlement? Either agree-
ment could provide for its modification under specified condi-
tions. But in the absence of such provision it would remain 
unchanged. \Vhy should not such an agreement for alimony 
alone be binding on the court if it is incorporated in the 
decree and approved? 
My position is that if the parties have agreed to a division 
of their property, or for support and maintenance for one 
of them without a property division, and that agreement 
has been approved by the court as fair and equitable, whether 
incorporated in the decree or not, their agreement sets forth 
the full sum of their rights and obligations and may not be 
modified without a subsequent agreement made by them. If 
they have not agreed on support and maintenance, the court 
may, upon application, provide for alimony which is then 
subject to modification under the rules applicable thereto, 
or if they have not agreed upon a property division the trial 
court may, on trial of the divorce action, divide the property 
of the parties in accord with settled principles of law appli-
cable to the case. 
I would affirm the order refusing modification in this case 
because the parties had, by their agreement, the pertinent 
provisions of which were incorporated in the decrees of 
divorce and approved by the court as fair and equitable, 
set forth their rights and liabilities. With respect to defend-
ant's appeal from the order granting plaintiff her attorneys' 
fees, defendant agreed in the agreement entered into between 
the parties to pay all attorneys' fees and costs incurred by 
plaintiff in any action for divorce which might be filed. The 
agreement contains no waiver on the part of plaintiff as to 
any further attorneys' fees, and the order granting such 
fees should be sustained inasmuch as any allowance therefor 
is discretionary with the trial court and there is here no 
claim of abuse of that discretion. 
